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Most importantly, straightforward instructions for applying influence diagrams to medical decisions were not available, and there was no convenient way for students to learn the basic principles that underlie their use. This gap led &dquo;classicists&dquo; and even &dquo;classical Bayesians&dquo; to point to influence diagrams as one more &dquo;theoretical Bayes&dquo; approach filling pages in methodologic journals without much practical application.
Owens, Nease, and Shachter have eliminated this barrier with their articulate, thorough, and accurate tutorials. In the first paper, they explain the components of influence diagrams and show how they correspond to the elements of decision trees. They then walk the reader through an algorithm demonstrating each step needed to evaluate or &dquo;solve&dquo; an influence diagram, presenting the recipe so clearly that the careful reader will learn and &dquo;own&dquo; the fundamental mathematical relationships that underlie the method. In the second paper, Nease and Owens take a step back and teach us how to design an influence diagram in the problem-formulation stage of a decision analysis. They present five principles and demonstrate their application in a lucid detailed example.
Although not light bedtime reading, these impor-tant papers make influence diagrams more available to the medical community. This new dimension to our modeling armamentarium can enhance communication among clinicians, patients, researchers and policy analysts, should &dquo;contribute to the enlargement of the imagination,&dquo;' and will surely improve the decisions we make and the outcomes they produce. MARK The beauty of death is its lack of ambiguity; it is indeed &dquo;the big zero&dquo; whence we do not return. Arbitrarily assigning it a utility of zero still permits assigning to health states viewed as worse than death negative scores, so death is a convenient reference point rather than the bottom of the utility scale. But a study in this issue of MDM1 reveals that the top anchor of the utility scale has not been defined consistently by researchers. This poses a major threat to the comparability of QALYs between studies. The question is: what is the meaning of &dquo;1&dquo; on these scales?
In the Fryback and Lawrence1 study, a variety of subtypes of the &dquo;1 problem&dquo; are examined. The essence is that a number of studies have measured &dquo;condition-specific&dquo; preferences where &dquo;1&dquo; is defined as the absence of a symptom or disease rather than the more global concept of maximal health. For example, suppose Study A has measured a utility of 0.7 for angina on a scale defined over death (= 0) and &dquo;no angina&dquo; (= 1), and that in Study B the utility of angina has been measured using scale anchors of death (= 0) and maximum health (= 1). The comparability of the QALYs estimated from the two measurements is a function of comorbidity in persons with angina. To remove my angina is not to return me to maximum health if I also suffer from arthritis. If the &dquo;1&dquo; of no angina is not the same as the &dquo;1&dquo; of maximum health, then the scales and utility values for angina are not comparable.
Why is this a problem? Fryback and Lawrence show that, compared with studies using &dquo;1&dquo; for maximum health, studies using &dquo;1&dquo; for the absence of a condition, in the presence of comorbidity, will tend to overestimate gains in QALYs, and hence the &dquo;bang per buck&dquo; in any cost-utility analysis.
Is there any salvation amidst this turmoil? Fryback and Lawrence show how population-based surveys of health-state utilities (scaled with &dquo;1&dquo; as maximum health) by age and gender, such as the Beaver Dam Health Outcomes Study,2 may provide data to reweight some condition-specific utilities into the broader 0-1 scale. For our example, knowing utilities for 65-year-old men who are without angina but who have the average collection of other ailments for a person of that age permits us to &dquo;deflate&dquo; the 0.7 condition-specific utility into the broader 0-1 scale.
But, as recognized by the authors, this is a limited fix for a problem that has deep philosophical roots with important measurement and policy ramifications. Part of the research agenda is to explore the context of measurement and cognition of respondents. In posing a standard-gamble question to a 65year-old man, what does the respondent conceive of as &dquo;excellent health,&dquo; even if we use that label? Does he understand this label to mean &dquo;healthy as I could expect for my age&dquo; or &dquo;healthy as I can remember being over my lifetime&dquo; or &dquo;where do I sign up for the next Olympics?&dquo; For health policy, do we want to count QALY gains over the life cycle in an absolute or relative sense, the latter being proportionate gains against a person's feasible maximum health for his or her age? There are important intergenerational equity implications arising out of this choice.
Fryback and Lawrence have shown us an important problem that needs future work and debate. QALY measurement is as well as can be expected, but is far from being perfectly healthy.
